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A REAL-WORLD ANALYSIS OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
SETTLEMENTS: THE MISSING DIMENSION OF PRODUCT 
HOPPING 
Michael A. Carrier*   
Abstract 
The pharmaceutical industry plays an important role in improving 
human health. But it also provides the setting for some of the most 
concerning issues in the patent-antitrust intersection today. Two activities 
are particularly worrisome. 
First, brand-name pharmaceutical firms and generic companies have 
settled patent litigation. As part of these agreements, brand firms have paid 
generic firms to drop their patent challenges and delay entering the market. 
Second, brand firms, frequently at the end of a patent term, have 
engaged in “product hopping,” often switching from one means of 
administering a drug (e.g., tablet) to another (e.g., capsule). 
In the past decade, courts and commentators have separately explored 
these activities. But no one has yet explored the intersection of these two 
forms of conduct. This Article tackles this project. In doing so, it uncovers 
a vital strategy that, until now, has fallen through the cracks of antitrust 
law. 
This Article will show that the combination of settlements and product 
hopping results in unrecognized, anticompetitive harm. Such a conclusion 
is particularly important given arguments offered by settling parties today, 
which on the surface appear reasonable. These parties have contended that 
settlements that allow entry before the end of the patent term are, by 
definition, procompetitive. After all, such entry would appear to introduce 
competition before patent expiration. This would seem to be a significant 
justification for the settlement. 
But the closer analysis presented here reveals anticompetitive effects 
arising from the combination of settlement and product hopping. For a 
settlement that prevents patent challenges for a period of time—even if less 
than the duration of the patent—gives the brand firm the space in which it 
can comfortably switch the market to the new product. So by the time, 
years later, when the generic enters, the market will have already been 
switched to the new product. The generic firm will no longer be able to 
take advantage of state drug product selection laws that allow pharmacists 
to automatically substitute generic drugs in place of brand-name drugs. In 
short, the lethal combination of the two activities erects a significant 
roadblock to pharmaceutical competition. 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. I would like to thank Meredyth 
Andrus, Pat Cafferty, and Steve Shadowen for helpful comments and Karalee Monahan for 
excellent research assistance.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry plays an important role in improving 
human health. But it also provides the setting for some of the most 
concerning issues in the patent-antitrust intersection today. Two activities 
are particularly worrisome. 
First, brand-name drug firms and generic companies have settled patent 
litigation. As part of these agreements, brand firms have paid generic firms 
to drop their patent challenges and delay entering the market. 
Second, drug companies, frequently at the end of patent terms, engage 
in “product hopping,” often switching from one means of administering the 
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drug (e.g., tablet) to another (e.g., capsule). 
In the past decade, courts and commentators have separately explored 
these activities. But no one has yet explored the intersection of these two 
forms of conduct. This Article tackles this project. In doing so, it uncovers 
a vital strategy that, until now, has fallen through the cracks of antitrust 
law. 
This Article will show that the combination of settlements and product 
hopping results in anticompetitive harm. Such a conclusion is particularly 
important given arguments offered by settling parties today, which on the 
surface appear reasonable. These parties have contended that settlements 
that allow entry before the end of the patent term are, by definition, 
procompetitive. After all, such entry would seem to introduce competition 
before patent expiration. This would appear to be a significant justification 
for the settlement. 
But the closer analysis presented here reveals the anticompetitive 
effects arising from the combination of settlement and product hopping. 
For a settlement that prevents patent challenges for a period of time—even 
if less than the duration of the patent—gives the brand firm the space in 
which it can comfortably switch the market to the new product. By the 
time, years later, when the generic enters, the market will have already 
been switched to the new product. As a result, the generic firm, which can 
no longer take advantage of state drug product selection laws, fails to 
provide meaningful competition. 
Part II of this Article sets the stage. It first presents an overview of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, which governs patent settlements in the 
pharmaceutical industry. It pays particular attention to the timing of generic 
entry in relation to the patent term. It then defines product hopping and 
focuses on the effect of state drug product selection laws, which allow 
pharmacists to automatically substitute generic for brand versions of drugs. 
This section also highlights the “price disconnect,” by which doctors 
prescribing medications do not directly consider the drug’s price. 
Part III presents a case study of the combined effect of settlements and 
product hopping. The drug Provigil, a sleep disorder medication, reveals 
Cephalon’s combination of the two practices. This company settled with 
the first four generic firms to challenge the patent, allowing entry several 
years before the expiration of the patent term. Such entry, however, was 
designed to occur after Cephalon switched the market to the new product, 
Nuvigil. 
Part IV presents a second study, of AndroGel, a testosterone gel 
replacement. In this case, manufacturer Solvay settled with generic firms, 
again allowing entry before the end of the patent term, but again garnering 
enough breathing room to—without any concern of patent challenges—
switch from one version of the gel to a second.1 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Nor are the cases limited to the United States. In the European Commission’s recent 
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Part V adds the product-hopping dimension to the analysis of drug 
settlements, which until now has neglected this element. Courts and 
commentators in recent years have focused on the appropriate treatment of 
reverse payments in drug settlements. But once the focus expands to 
consider the brand firm’s overall strategy, the framework shifts. 
Without considering the brand firm’s product hopping, the settlement 
framework resembles one in which 1) the brand firm maintains its 
monopoly, followed by 2) a period (before patent expiration) in which 
generics enter the market, fostering competition. 
Adding the product-hopping dimension shifts the framework to one in 
which 1) the brand firm ensures that its patent will not be challenged, 
followed by 2) a period (before patent expiration) in which generic 
competition will mean little given the migration of patients to a new 
product not subject to state drug product selection laws. 
A focus on the product-hopping dimension of drug firms’ strategies 
uncovers the lethal combination of guaranteed immunity from challenge 
and a lack of meaningful competition after generic entry. 
II.   BACKGROUND 
To understand brand firms’ strategy of combining settlements and 
product hopping, a separate explanation of the two would be useful. This 
Part thus provides a brief overview of drug settlements, paying special 
attention to the timing of generic entry. It then discusses product hopping, 
focusing on the state drug product selection laws, which dramatically 
increase generic competition but which frequently are the target of product 
hopping. 
A.  Settlements 
1.  Hatch-Waxman Act 
The framework governing drug patent settlements is the Hatch-
Waxman Act,2 enacted by Congress in 1984 to increase generic 
competition and foster innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.3 
                                                                                                                     
report on the pharmaceutical industry, product hopping played a potential role in 108 of the 207 
reported brand-generic settlements. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY 
FINAL REPORT 365 (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_ 
working_paper_part1.pdf. Although such figures have not been compiled in the United States, the 
phenomenon seems to have increased in recent years, as judged by the activity in complaints filed 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), see, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief, FTC v. 
Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-00244 (JDB) (D.D.C. 2008) [hereinafter Cephalon Complaint], and by 
conversations with FTC officials about trends in recent filings under the Medicare Modernization 
Act. 
 2. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)). 
 3. Teresa Stanek Rea, Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug Price 
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One central goal of the Act was to promote generic competition.4 
Generic drugs have the same active ingredients, dosage, administration, 
performance, and safety as patented brand drugs.5 De pite the equivalence, 
generic manufacturers were required, at the time of the Act, to engage in 
lengthy and expensive trials to demonstrate safety and effectiveness.6 The 
FDA approval process took several years, and because the required tests 
constituted infringement, generics could not begin the process during the 
patent term.7 They therefore waited until the end of the term to begin these 
activities, which prevented them from entering the market until two or 
three years after the patent’s expiration.8 At the time Congress enacted 
Hatch-Waxman, there was no generic equivalent for roughly 150 drugs 
whose patent terms had lapsed.9 
In the Act, Congress employed several mechanisms to encourage 
competition. First, it allowed firms to experiment on the drug during the 
patent term. In particular, the legislature exempted from infringement the 
manufacture, use, or sale of a patented invention for uses “reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information” under a federal 
law regulating the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.10 
Second, Congress created a new process for obtaining FDA approval. 
Before Hatch-Waxman, generic firms that offered products identical to 
approved drugs needed to independently prove safety and efficacy.11 One 
reason that generic companies chose not to bring products to the market 
after a patent’s expiration was the expense and time involved in replicating 
clinical studies.12 The Act created a new type of drug application, called an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), that allowed generic firms to 
rely on brands’ safety and effectiveness studies, dispensing with the need 
for lengthy and expensive independent preclinical or clinical studies.13 
                                                                                                                     
Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act—An Introduction of Speakers, 54 FOOD &  
DRUG L.J. 223, 224 (1999).  
 4. For a discussion of the mechanisms used to carry out the other primary goal, fostering 
innovation, see Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 43–45 (2009) (discussing patent term extensions, 
non-patent market exclusivity, and an automatic 30-month stay of FDA approval of generics). 
 5. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Generic Drugs: What You Need to Know, 
http://www.fda.gov/buyonlineguide/generics_q&a.htm (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 6. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS 
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 43–44 (1998). 
 7. Id. at 38. 
 8. Id. 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650. 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). 
 11. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, 
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 589–90 (2003). 
 12. See id. 
 13. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY 5 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter 
GENERIC DRUG STUDY]. 
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Most relevant for our purposes, the Act provided 180 days of marketing 
exclusivity to the first generic firm to certify that the brand firm’s patent 
was not valid or that the generic’s drug did not infringe the patent.14 Such 
exclusivity was reserved for the first generic firm—known as a “Paragraph 
IV filer”—that sought to enter during the patent term.15 During the period, 
which begins after the first commercial marketing of the drug, the FDA 
cannot approve other ANDAs for the same product.16 
2.  Antitrust Concern 
This exclusivity has resulted in numerous settlements between brand 
firms and first-filing generic companies. By paying the first-filer to delay 
entering the market, the brand firm can prevent entry not only by that 
generic but also by all other generics. The reason is that these firms cannot 
enter the market until 180 days after the first-filer’s entry.17 And as a result 
of the settlement with the brand firm, the generics’ entry is delayed for 
years.  
It is in the interest of both the brand firm and the first-filing generic 
firm to settle, especially with payments from the brand to the generic 
known as “reverse payments.”18 The brand firm benefits by blocking 
challenges that could invalidate its patent. And the generic company 
receives a subset of the brand firm’s monopoly profits that may even 
exceed what it could have gained through successful litigation and market 
entry. Consumers, on the other hand, suffer from the stifling of challenges 
to patents that often are invalid.19 
At the same time, subsequent generic filers have not played a 
meaningful role in challenging those settlements. Even if they prove the 
patent’s invalidity, that would only trigger the first-filer’s 180 days of 
exclusivity. In addition, if the brand firm does not sue later-filing generic 
firms, these generics may not be able to obtain a judicial determination of 
the validity of the brand firm’s patent given the difficulties of obtaining 
                                                                                                                     
 14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). 
 15. Id. Three other patent certifications apply if the drug is not patented, the patent has 
expired, or the generic agrees it will not seek approval until the patent expires. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006). 
 16. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 13, at 7. Until amended in 2003, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act included a court decision finding invalidity or lack of infringement as a second trigger for the 
start of the 180-day period. Erika Lietzan & David E. Korn, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-Day 
Exclusivity, 62 FOOD &  DRUG L.J. 49, 63 (2007). 
 17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 18. These agreements are called reverse payments since they differ from typical licensing 
payments that flow from challengers to patentees. S e Carrier, supra note 4, at 39. 
 19. In a study of Paragraph IV challenges between 1992 and 2000, the FTC found that the 
generic prevailed in 73% of the patent infringement cases and that the brand-name companies won 
only 27% of the time. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 13, at 16. These figures are consistent with 
a survey of Federal Circuit decisions from 2002 through 2004 that found that pharmaceutical 
patentees were successful on the merits in 30% of the cases. Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who 
Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 20 (2006). 
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declaratory judgment. 
Most generally, the parties’ reverse-payment settlements threaten severe 
anticompetitive dangers. They are a type of market division, with the brand 
firm blocking all competition for a period of time.20 Market division, 
which antitrust courts view as per se illegal,21 is concerning because it 
restricts all competition between the parties on all grounds. 
Not all patent settlements, to be sure, constitute market allocation 
agreements. If a patent is valid and infringed, the patentee could rely on the 
patent itself to restrict competition. In that case, an agreement that allows a 
generic to enter before the end of the patent term could increase 
competition. But if a patent is invalid or not infringed, there is no 
legitimate justification for delaying competition. 
The appropriate antitrust treatment of patent settlements thus depends 
on the validity of the patent and existence of infringement. But the most 
straightforward way to determine these issues, patent litigation, is not 
appropriate in this setting. Determining patent validity and infringement 
would require significant analysis and testimony on complex issues such as 
patent claim interpretation and infringement analysis. Such inquiries, 
which could take weeks, cannot be inserted as mini-trials within antitrust 
cases.22 
3.  Timing of Generic Entry 
One central element of settlements has been the timing of generic entry. 
Most generally (and oversimplifying dramatically), the longer the generic 
firm agrees to refrain from entering the market, the more concern arises. 
Anticompetitive effects are highest if the generic firm agrees not to enter 
during the entire patent term. In contrast, generic entry before the end of a 
valid patent term encourages competition within the term, which benefits 
consumers. 
In some of the early settlements, the generic company agreed to stay out 
of the market for all or nearly all of the patent term. For example, in In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,23 generic firm Barr agreed in 1993 
not to enter the market with a generic breast cancer treatment until brand 
firm Zeneca’s patent expired in 2002.24 And in In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,25 brand firm Bayer in 1997 paid 
                                                                                                                     
 20. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2003 WL 22989651, Part II.A (F.T.C. 2003), vacated by 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC., 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 21. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam). 
 22. In addition, an analysis of the merits of the patent infringement case would be unreliable. 
After a case settles, the parties’ interests become aligned, with a generic firm lacking the incentive 
to vigorously attack a patent’s validity or an infringement claim. 
 23. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 24. Id. at 193–94. 
 25. 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’g, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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generic firm Barr to stay out of the market until six months before Bayer’s 
patent on Cipro, a drug treating bacterial illnesses, expired in 2003.26 
In recent settlements, however, such as those concerning Provigil and 
AndroGel,27 the parties have provided for generic entry for longer periods 
before the end of the term. They presumably have reached such 
arrangements to convince courts that the agreements are procompetitive. 
After all, the argument goes, the brand firm could, relying on its patent 
alone, prevent competition until the end of the patent. In that context, 
several years of competition before expiration appear procompetitive. 
Cephalon, for example, touted the “obvious benefits and efficiencies” of its 
Provigil settlement,28 which “permitted the [g]enerics to enter the market 
three years prior to the expiration of the . . . patent.”29 
Even Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney, in her answers to 
questions for her confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, remarked that “A patent holder who enters into a commercial 
arrangement to allow a competitor to enter the market prior to the patent’s 
expiration would most likely be procompetitive.” 30 
While such a position could conceivably apply in the context of the 
patent that is the focus of settlement,31 a closer look at a separate 
dimension uncovers potentially significant flaws in the argument. 
B.  Product Hopping 
1.  Definition 
The new dimension revealed in this Article is “product hopping.” This 
activity (also known as “evergreening” or “line extension”) refers to a drug 
company’s reformulation of its product. There are several types of such 
redesigns. 
One type involves new forms, which consist of reformulations from 
capsules, tablets, or solutions to other forms, such as any of the above as 
well as extended-release drugs and chewable tablets.32 Another type 
involves changing molecule parts (known as “moieties”) by adding or 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 1328–29. 
 27. See infra Parts II–III. 
 28. This settlement is described below. See infra Part III. 
 29. Defendant Cephalon, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion to Dismiss at 1, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08-cv-
00244). 
 30. Stephen Albainy-Jenei, FTC Position on Reverse Payments: Settlements Can Be 
Procompetitive, PATENT BARISTAS, May 13, 2009, http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2009/05/ 
13/ftc-position-on-reverse-payments-settlements-can-be-procompetitive/ (italicization formatting 
removed). 
 31. Even this position is more nuanced than explained in the text. See infra note 151. 
 32. Keith Leffler et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 
RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 24, on file with author). 
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removing compounds.33 A third is a combination of two or more drug 
compositions that had previously been marketed separately.34 
There are numerous examples of these reformulations.35 For example, 
the makers of the antidepressant Prozac and the cholesterol treatment 
TriCor switched from capsule to tablet form, while anxiety-treating Buspar 
was switched from tablet to capsule.36 
Chemical changes explained the switch from allergy medication 
Claritin to Clarinex, antidepressant Celexa to Lexapro, and heartburn 
medications Prevacid to Kapidex and Prilosec to Nexium.37 
Combinations of drugs occurred with migraine-treatment Treximet 
(combining Imitrex and Naproxen Sodium) and high-blood-pressure 
medications Azor (Norvasc and Benicar), Caduet (Norvasc and Lipitor), 
and Exforge (Norvasc and Diovan).38 
Much of this product-hopping activity has been successful because it 
has avoided the effect of state drug product selection laws. 
2.  State Drug Product Selection Laws 
State drug product selection (DPS) laws, in effect in all fifty states 
today, are designed to lower prices for consumers. These laws allow—and 
in many cases require—pharmacists, absent a doctor’s contrary 
instructions, to substitute generic versions of brand-name prescriptions. 
DPS laws are designed to address the disconnect in the industry 
between prescribing doctors, who are not directly responsive to drug 
pricing, and paying insurers and consumers, who do not directly select the 
prescribed drug.39 In particular, DPS laws carve out a role for pharmacists, 
who are much more sensitive to prices than doctors.40 
Doctors are subject to a vast array of drug promotion, which includes 
detailing (sales calls to doctor’s offices), direct mailings, free drug 
samples, medical journal advertising, sponsored continuing medical 
education programs, and media advertising.41 Pharmacists, in contrast, 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. (manuscript at 24–25). 
 34. Id. (manuscript at 25) (discussing, as well, enantiomers, molecules that are mirror images 
of each other). 
 35. See Rebecca S. Yoshitani & Ellen S. Cooper, Pharmaceutical Reformulation: The 
Growth of Life Cycle Management, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &  POL. 379, 388 (2007) (“[S]ixty percent 
of New Drug Applications submitted to the FDA in the 1990s were for drugs containing existing 
active ingredients.”). 
 36. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 36, 42). 
 37. Id. (manuscript at 31–32). 
 38. Id. (manuscript at 25, 40). 
 39. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF REPORT TO THE 
FTC 2–3 (1979). 
 40. ALISON MASSON &  ROBERT L. STEINER, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS 7 (1985). 
 41. STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 87–93 (2d ed. 2007). 
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respond to consumer demand and compete with other pharmacies on 
price.42 
Reformulation eliminates both price and quality competition. It 
eliminates quality competition since the brand firm switches its promotion 
to the new product, leaving doctors unable to effectively compare quality 
between the reformulated brand drug and the old version.43 It also limits 
price competition because it evades the DPS laws.44 
The DPS laws typically allow pharmacists to substitute generic versions 
of brand drugs only if they are “AB-rated” by the FDA. To receive an AB 
rating, a generic drug must be therapeutically equivalent to the brand drug, 
which means that the generic has the same active ingredient, form, dosage, 
strength, and safety and efficacy profile.45 The drug also must be 
bioequivalent, which signifies that the rate and extent of absorption in the 
body is roughly equivalent to the brand drug.46 
The concern when a brand reformulates its drug is that the generic 
version of the first product is not bioequivalent to the second product. And 
while the generic firm may eventually show bioequivalence, such a 
showing likely will not occur for years. There are several reasons for the 
delay. 
First, the generic manufacturer must reformulate its product. This 
period is extended because the brand firm does not need to provide notice 
to the generic firm of the reformulation.47 Second, the generic firm must 
seek FDA approval (which typically takes at least eighteen months) for this 
new version.48 And third, in many cases, the generic firm will file a 
Paragraph-IV certification, which is followed by the brand firm’s 
automatic “thirty month stay” of FDA approval and additional delays from 
patent litigation.49 As a result of these delays, the pharmacist is not able to 
substitute the generic version of the old product for the brand version of 
the new product.50 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See MASSON &  STEINER, supra note 40, at 7. 
 43. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 3) (“We examine the economic effect . . . with 
special emphasis on identifying the particular dimension of rivalry—price competition or quality 
comparisons—that is affected.”). 
 44. Id. (manuscript at 17–18). 
 45. FDA Center For Drug Evaluation and Research, Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (30th ed.), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval  
process/ucm079068.htm (last visited May 8, 2010) [hereinafter Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations]; Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 5). 
 46. See Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, supra note 45. 
 47. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 6). 
 48. LEON SHARGEL &  ISADORE KANFER, GENERIC DRUG PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 366 (2005). 
 49. Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1488–89, 1489 n.107 (2008). The period could extend an additional 
twelve months depending on when the generic filed its Paragraph IV certification. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006); see generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1566 n.50 (2006). 
 50. Cheng, supra note 49, at 487–88. 
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Compounding this problem—and as discussed in detail below in the 
setting of the Provigil case—the brand firm typically will switch its 
promotional efforts to the new drug. In fact, it will often highlight the 
advantages of the new product as compared to the old.51 At the same time, 
no other party has the incentive and ability to promote the old product, 
which leads to doctors receiving “an entirely one-sided presentation” of the 
relative merits of the products.52 The case of Abbott Laboratories v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. reveals the dangers of product hopping for 
generic substitution.53 
3.  Generic Substitution Case 
The drug at the center of Abbott Laboratories was TriCor, a billion-
dollar drug used to lower cholesterol and triglycerides.54 In 1998, Abbott 
received FDA approval of its capsule version of TriCor. During the next 
two years, two generic firms filed ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications 
challenging TriCor. In 2003, the generic firms received favorable 
judgments in litigation. In the intervening period, however, Abbott had 
marginally lowered the drug’s strength and switched from a capsule form 
of the drug to a tablet form. These changes prevented pharmacists from 
substituting generic versions of TriCor. 
Abbott took direct aim at this regime with its plan to switch to a new 
version of TriCor. Not only did it switch to a tablet form, but it 1) stopped 
selling capsules; 2) bought back the existing supplies of the capsules from 
the pharmacies; and 3) changed the code for TriCor capsules in the 
National Drug Data File (NDDF)55 to obsolete.56 As the district court 
observed, these activities “prevented pharmacies from filling TriCor 
prescriptions with a generic capsule formulation.”57 
The generic firms then developed equivalents for the tablet formulation 
and submitted ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications. Abbott sued and 
transitioned to a new type of tablet, marked by, again, marginally lower 
strength. And again, Abbott stopped selling the old TriCor tablets and 
changed the NDDF code on these tablets to obsolete. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 51. See infra Part III. 
 52. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 45) (explaining that other brands lack the 
incentive to promote a competitor’s products and that generics will not promote the product because 
they do not have large sales forces and would worry about free-riding by other generics). 
 53. 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006). 
 54. The facts are taken from id. at 415–18. 
 55. The NDDF, which guides pharmacists in determining substitution, is “a comprehensive 
set of drug data base elements, drug pricing and clinical information.” First DataBank, National 
Drug Data File (NDDF) Plus, http://www.firstdatabank.com/Products/national-drug-file-
NDDF.aspx (last visited May 10, 2010).  
 56. Abbott, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 416. 
 57. Id. 
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The district court applied a rule-of-reason approach in denying Abbott’s 
motion to dismiss. It found that Abbott allegedly prevented a choice 
between products “by removing the old formulations from the market 
while introducing new formulations.”58 The court also found that through 
Abbott’s “allegedly manipulative and unjustifiable formulation changes,” 
Teva and Impax were not able to offer generic substitutes for TriCor, 
which was the alleged “cost-efficient means of competing” in the market.59 
In short, the DPS laws, which play a central role in containing 
prescription drug pricing in all fifty states, were directly threatened by 
Abbott’s activity. The activity reveals the role that product hopping plays 
in evading the state drug product selection laws. 
4.  Timing of Reformulation 
Product hopping is most successful when brand firms can not only 
avoid state DPS laws but also orchestrate effective timing. Stated most 
simply, the brand firm will be more successful if it can switch the market 
before generic entry. 
Introducing the new product before the generic enters the market “adds 
the near-elimination of price competition to the near-elimination of quality 
competition.”60 Brand firms offer the “uncontested message” of the new 
product’s superiority as the manufacturer’s detailers “extol the virtues of 
the new product” at a time that “no one is promoting the original.”61 In 
addition, brand firms make the switch “when doctors do not have a generic 
alternative available and do not know that one may be on the way.”62 
Several examples demonstrate the crucial role played by timing. In the 
TriCor case, one document demonstrated the different projected sales 
based on timing. The brand firm, Abbott, predicted that if it launched its 
reformulated version before generic entry, sales would rise from 161 
million Euros in 2004 to 269 million Euros in 2008.63 But if the 
reformulation did not reach the market before the generic, sales would only 
reach 35 million Euros in 2004 and 15 million Euros in 2008.64 In other 
words, in 2008, sales would be more than 17 times greater if Abbott 
introduced the new version before generic entry. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 422. 
 59. Id. at 423. The case ultimately settled. See, e.g., Seth Silber & Kara Kuritz, Product 
Switching in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Ripe for Antitrust Scrutiny?, 7 J. GENERIC MEDS. 119, 
123 (2010).  
 60. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 50). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 6 (2009) (unpublished presentation, on file with author), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-hcic/pdf/past-programs/10-28-09-shadowen.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
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Another example revealed by Keith Leffler, Joseph Lukens, and Steve 
Shadowen involved a confidential analysis of a product for which 
projected sales in the first three years after generic entry would be nearly 
three times higher if the reformulation (replacing a twice-daily version with 
one taken once a day) occurred before generic entry than after.65 Similar 
testimony in a different case referred to the launch of a reformulated 
product after generic entry as a “[t]otal [d]isaster.”66 
The importance of timing also was recognized by the Final Report of 
the European Commission, which addressed obstacles blocking generic 
entry.67 The report concluded that brands would suffer reduced sales and 
prices if generics entered the market before or at the same time as the 
follow-on product.68 For that reason, “[I]t is of [the] utmost importance for 
the originator company to bring the follow-on product on the market before 
the first product effectively loses exclusivity.”69 
The brand firm facilitates such a switch by “channelling . . . demand 
from the first product to the follow-on product” and by “delay[ing] or 
prevent[ing] generic entry for the sensitive period of the product switch.”70 
For 13 of the 22 second-generation products in the report, the new product 
was launched before the first lost its exclusivity, with an average lead time 
of 17 months.71 
The report included several telling comments from drug companies. 
One brand firm explained that “the switch rate is dramatically reduced” if 
generics enter at the time of, or before, the second-generation product.72 
Similarly, as another brand company revealed: “[E]ach patient that is not 
switched quickly enough” to the second-generation product “is forever lost 
to the generics.”73 In contrast, as a third brand firm conceded: “Once the 
patient is switched to [the new product] the physician does not have to, 
cannot and will not switch him to a generic, and . . . more important: the 
pharmacist cannot substitute!!”74 
In short, the timing of reformulation matters significantly. Brand firms 
have a considerable interest in forestalling generic entry until after they can 
switch the market to the new product. Such a delay protects them from 
selling and marketing their branded drugs against cheaper generics. The 
next two parts of the Article, discussing the drugs Provigil and AndroGel, 
demonstrate how brand firms have used settlements to ensure that generic 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. 
 66. Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharms., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 67. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 10. 
 68. Id. at 356. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 361 fig.138. The Report considered patent and data exclusivity. Id. at 22–23. 
 72. Id. at 359. 
 73. Id. at 360. 
 74. Id. 
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entry does not occur before they can switch the market to the reformulated 
product. 
III.   CASE STUDY 1: PROVIGIL 
A.  Facts 
The case of Provigil is the most vivid example of the interplay of 
settlements and product hopping. Provigil is a sleep-disorder medication 
marketed by Cephalon. It was initially approved for excessive daytime 
sleepiness associated with narcolepsy and was subsequently used to treat 
obstructive sleep apnea and shift work sleep disorder.75 U.S. soldiers, most 
famously those fighting in the Iraq War, have used it to stay awake for as 
long as 40 hours at a time.76 
The drug offers significant benefits over other amphetamine-like 
stimulants. In particular, it does not produce side effects such as addiction, 
feeling jittery, and crashing afterward.77 As a result, the drug is considered 
the “gold standard” for the treatment of the excessive sleepiness 
accompanying sleep disorders.78 U.S. sales of Provigil have increased from 
$25 million in 1999 to $475 million in 2005 to $800 million in 2007.79 
The active ingredient in Provigil is a chemical compound called 
modafinil.80 Cephalon filed a New Drug Application for Provigil in 1996, 
which the FDA approved in 1998.81 The U.S. patent covering modafinil 
was issued in 1979 and expired in 2001.82 
Cephalon obtained a second patent in 1997. This patent covered a 
formulation of modafinil that consisted of a specified distribution of small 
particles.83 This narrower patent lasts until October 2014, with Cephalon 
receiving an additional six months of pediatric exclusivity extending 
protection to April 2015.84 
Unlike the patent on the compound itself, generic firms could, without 
difficulty, avoid this narrow formulation patent. As a consultant advised 
Cephalon in 2002: “[A]ll generic companies know [that the patent] may be 
                                                                                                                     
 75. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 26. 
 76. Tom Spears, New Drug May Help Soldiers Stay Awake Doctors Unsure of Long-Term 
Effect, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 11, 2003, http://www.modafinil.com/article/soldiers.html. 
 77. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 27. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. ¶ 28. 
 80. Id. ¶ 24. 
 81. Id. ¶ 26. 
 82. Id. ¶ 32. 
 83. Id. ¶ 33. 
 84. Press Release, Cephalon, Cephalon Granted Six Months of Pediatric Exclusivity for 
Provigil(R), Mar. 28, 2006, http://www.cephalon.com/media/news-releases.shtml?mode=year&  
filterval=2006 (last visited May 7, 2010) (noting that Cephalon “met the terms of a written request 
to provide data from clinical studies examining the effect of Provigil in pediatric patients”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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easily circumvented” by manufacturing products to contain a different 
distribution of modafinil particle sizes.85 
Given the ease with which generic firms could circumvent the particle-
size patent, it is no surprise they were eager to do so. As the FTC explained 
in its complaint: “On December 24, 2002, the first day that the FDA could 
accept an ANDA for generic Provigil, four companies submitted 
applications . . . .”86 Teva, Ranbaxy, Mylan, and Barr each certified “that 
[their] version[s] of generic Provigil did not infringe . . . [the] [p]atent, that 
the patent was invalid, or both.”87 
Each of the four generic firms developed non-infringing versions of 
Provigil.88 And since all four filed on the same day, they could share the 
180-day Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period.89 
As the FTC pointed out in the complaint: “Cephalon knew that generic 
Provigil entry would lead to substantial declines in the company’s 
revenues.”90 A Cephalon vice president projected a 75%–90% price 
reduction that would lower revenues by more than $400 million (nearly 
75% of the drug’s annual sales) within one year.91 
The generic firms estimated a similar impact. Teva projected that 
generic versions “would garner 90[%] of all modafinil prescriptions within 
a month.”92 The price was projected to fall to 5%–10% of Provigil’s price 
within one year.93 
The generic firms’ claims, in fact, were supported by the consensus in 
the industry. Wall Street analysts projected generic entry in 2006.94 The 
four first-filing generic firms planned for a launch in June 2006, at the 
latest.95 Barr ordered significant quantities of the active ingredient in late 
2005.96 And Cephalon asserted, in November 2005, that “generic versions 
of modafinil” would enter the market in the middle of 2006.97 
Cephalon sought to maintain its market share by introducing a 
successor product, Nuvigil, in 2006.98 The longer-lasting Nuvigil was 
similar to Provigil in many ways, including chemical composition.99 It 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 35. 
 86. Id. ¶ 36. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. ¶ 37. 
 89. Id. ¶ 38. 
 90. Id. ¶ 39. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. ¶ 40. 
 93. Id. (noting that Teva projected 10% and Ranbaxy projected 5%). 
 94. Id. ¶ 51. 
 95. Id. ¶ 50. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. ¶ 48. 
 98. Id. ¶ 52. 
 99. Press Release, Cephalon, Cephalon Receives FDA Approval of NUVIGIL(TM) for the 
Treatment of Excessive Sleepiness Associated with Three Disorders, June 18, 2007, 
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offered modest improvements by allowing patients to take a pill once a day 
instead of two times daily. Cephalon also sought to switch to Nuvigil to 
expand its customer base to cover other conditions.100 
The FDA, however, “had not approved Nuvigil by late 2005.”101 And, 
as the FTC pointed out, “[T]here was considerable uncertainty as to 
whether the FDA would approve Nuvigil early enough in 2006 to enable 
Cephalon to successfully migrate customers from Provigil to Nuvigil 
before the entry of a generic version of Provigil.”102 Given this uncertainty, 
Cephalon decided to settle patent litigation with the four first-filing generic 
firms.103 
Cephalon paid more than $200 million to the four generic firms to agree 
to forgo entry until April 2012.104 The Cephalon CEO conceded that the 
settlements provided “six more years of patent protection[,]” which was 
“$4 billion in sales that no one expected.”105 
B.  The Big Picture: Product Hopping and Settlement Interplay 
In its motion to dismiss the complaint, which the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently denied,106 Cephalon noted 
that the settlement, which allowed entry in 2012, “resulted in generic entry 
years earlier than patent expiration” in 2015.107 This is typical of 
arguments voiced by proponents of recent reverse-payment settlements, 
who justify the agreements by pointing to the guaranteed years of 
competition before the end of the patent term. 
A bird’s-eye view of the activity, however, shows how the various 
forms of anticompetitive behavior fit together. Cephalon had no intention 
of competing in a robust market with generic firms in 2012. The generic 
firms themselves, in obtaining more than $200 million from Cepahlon, did 
not expect vibrant competition in 2012. 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.cephalon.com/media/news-releases.shtml?mode=year&filterval=2007 (last visited May 
7, 2010) (follow “Cephalon Receives FDA Approval of NUVIGIL(TM) . . .” hyperlink). As the 
Cephalon press release points out, “The active pharmaceutical ingredient in Nuvigil, armodafinil, is 
the longer-lived r-enantiomer [molecule’s mirror image] of modafinil, the active ingredient in 
Provigil.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 100. Cephalon, Inc., Q1 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, May 5, 2009, available at http://seek 
ingalpha.com/article/135541-cephalon-inc-q1-2009-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1 (discussing 
clinical trials for jet-lag disorders, bipolar depression, sleep apnea, co-morbid major depressive 
disorder, and traumatic brain injury). 
 101. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 52. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. ¶ 53. 
 104. Id. ¶ 3. 
 105. Id. ¶ 4. 
 106. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 2010 WL 1221793 (E.D.Pa., Mar. 29, 
2010). 
 107. Defendant Cephalon, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion to Dismiss at 26, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08-cv-
00244). 
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Rather, by delaying the potential onset of generic competition until 
2012, six years after settlement, Cephalon bought itself a period in which it 
was guaranteed that its weak Provigil patent would not be challenged. 
With that certainty in hand, Cephalon could enjoy the luxury of an 
extended period in which it could switch the market to its new sleepiness 
drug, Nuvigil. Nuvigil, which the FDA approved in 2007, enjoys patent 
protection until 2023.108  
A Cephalon spokesman conceded that after settlement “[t]he pressure is 
not what it was” and that the company was not required “to make a quick 
transition from Provigil to Nuvigil.”109 And an industry analyst agreed that 
the delay would “‘allow Cepahlon to seek to expand its wakefulness 
franchise’” rather than treating Nuvigil “‘merely as a conversion 
opportunity . . . that would be under pressure to establish itself early.’”110 
C.  Specific Strategy 
1.  Make Provigil Less Desirable 
Cepahlon’s switching strategy had two simple components: making 
Provigil less desirable and making Nuvigil more desirable.111 The easiest 
way to make Provigil less desirable was to increase its price. Between 2004 
and 2008, Cephalon increased the price of Provigil by 74%.112 As a 
Cephalon vice president remarked: “[W]e will likely raise Provigil prices 
to try to create an incentive for the reimbursers to preferentially move to 
Nuvigil.” 113  
Another means to reduce Provigil’s attractiveness was to stop 
promoting it. And that is what it did. Cephalon officials explained that they 
“actually pulled all promotion from Provigil” after the first quarter of 2009 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Cephalon Receives FDA Approval Of Nuvigil(TM) for the Treatment of Excessive 
Sleepiness Associated with Three Disorders, MED. NEWS TODAY, June 19, 2007, 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/printerfriendlynews.php?newsid=74585 (last visited May 7, 
2010). 
 109. Robert Steyer, Cephalon Puts Worries to Rest, THESTREET, Feb. 14, 2006, 
http://www.thestreet.com/print/story/10268224.html (last visited May 7, 2010).  
 110. Id. 
 111. Another example involving similar strategies was Cephalon’s switch from pain 
management drug Actiq to Fentora, a similar drug requiring lower doses. First, Cephalon “increased 
the price of Actiq substantially” and “stopped . . . detailing Actiq[.]” Cephalon, Inc., Q4 2006 
Earnings Call Transcript, Feb. 12, 2007, available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/26813-
cephalon-q4-2006-earnings-call-transcript (emphasis omitted). As a result, the market “retract[ed] a 
bit[,]” which the firm’s CEO conceded was “probably our own doing.” Id  
Second, it focused its marketing efforts on Fentora. When it had “a chance to talk to the 
doctors” about both products, Cephalon “talk[ed] about Fentora.” Id. And it lowered the new drug’s 
price, which was “very attractive to physicians” and gave the company’s representatives a favorable 
pricing story. Id. 
 112. Jonathan D. Rockoff, How a Drug Maker Tries to Outwit Generics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 
2008, at B1. 
 113. Id. 
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“in anticipation of the Nuvigil launch[,]” which occurred in June.114 
Specifically, Cephalon pulled all samples, promotional materials, and 
messaging on Provigil in order to replace them with new materials and 
samples on Nuvigil.115 A Cephalon official highlighted the firm’s efforts 
for Nuvigil, which included “promotional efforts[,] . . . patient sampling 
programs, discount programs for patients, a significant number of key 
opinion leader/speaker presentations, and a contracting plan with certain 
health care payers.”116 
2.  Make Nuvigil More Desirable 
Having weakened the competitive position of Provigil, Cepahlon set off 
on its second task: promoting Nuvigil. The CEO sang Nuvigil’s praises: 
“With an extensive clinical program supporting Nuvigil, and a patent that 
extends to 2023, we believe that Nuvigil will be a very successful product 
that will ultimately benefit more patients than Provigil.”117 
The company vigorously promoted Nuvigil. As soon as Cephalon 
brought Nuvigil to the market, “close to 800 salespeople [would] be out 
there” selling it.118 And more: 
• “[I]t’s really all focused now on Nuvigil and the 
launch of that product and doing absolutely everything 
we can to ensure that physicians have a good 
experience in prescribing it and that it’s available to 
patients and that they have a terrific experience when 
they take it.”119 
 
• “We are going to be launching this product, doing so 
very vigorously. We believe that Nuvigil is a better 
product than Provigil.”120 
Bringing it all together was the “excitement” in the marketplace from 
the cheaper, “more effective” Nuvigil. Revealing all too little of its role in 
increasing Provigil’s price, Cephalon played coy in being “particularly 
pleased to offer Nuvigil at a discount to Provigil.”121 A Cepahlon official 
explained that Nuvigil’s pricing at a discount has “generated a lot of 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Cepahlon Q1 2009 Transcript, supra note 100 (emphasis omitted). 
 115. Cephalon, Inc., Q2 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, Aug. 4, 2007, available at http://seek 
ingalpha.com/article/153789-cephalon-inc-q2-2009-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Cephalon, Inc., Q4 2008 Earnings Call Transcript, Feb. 13, 2009, available at http://seek 
ingalpha.com/article/120423-cephalon-inc-q4-2008-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1 (emphasis 
omitted).  
 118. Cepahlon Q1 2009 transcript, supra note 100.  
 119. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 120. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 121. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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excitement[,] . . . [with] [t]he formularies and the physicians and 
pharmacists and bean counters that we’re talking to . . . all see[ing] the 
economic benefit that Nuvigil will be able to provide.”122 
Of course, given Provigil’s methodically-increasing costs and the 
guaranteed lack of generic entry until 2012, it was only natural that 
insurers and health-plan managers would switch patients to Nuvigil. 
Cephalon should not have been surprised with Nuvigil’s price advantage. 
In short, Cephalon’s switch from Provigil to Nuvigil, undertaken in the 
context of its settlement with four generic firms that were no longer able to 
challenge its Provigil patent, raises concern regarding the anticompetitive 
effect of the intersection of product hopping and settlement. 
IV.   CASE STUDY 2: ANDROGEL 
A second case study is presented by the testosterone-replacement drug 
AndroGel. 
A.  Facts 
Solvay is the maker of AndroGel, a testosterone gel applied daily to the 
skin.123 AndroGel treats low testosterone, a deficiency that may cause 
fatigue, decreased sexual function, and depressed mood.124 There is no cure 
for low testosterone; instead, it is a medical condition that requires ongoing 
treatment.125 
AndroGel has been Solvay’s highest-selling product. AndroGel sales in 
the United States have risen from $26 million in 2000 to $277 million in 
2003 to more than $400 million in 2007.126 From 2000 to 2007, 
AndroGel’s cumulative U.S. sales exceeded $1.8 billion.127 
AndroGel’s strong sales figures belie limited patent protection. 
Testosterone, the active ingredient in AndroGel, has been available in drug 
products since the 1950s.128 Patents for synthesizing artificial testosterone 
expired decades ago.129 Nonetheless, in 2000, Solvay applied for a patent 
covering the use of a gel formulation containing testosterone and other 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id.; see also Rockoff, supra note 112 (quoting national medical director for Aetna 
Pharmacy Management as stating, “It’s really hard to take a higher price now for a lower price in 
the future when the future is very far away”). 
 123. AndroGel, What is AndroGel?, http://www.androgel.com/aboutandrogel.html (last visited 
May 7, 2010). 
 124. AndroGel, What is Low T?, http://www.androgel.com/about_lowt.html (last visited May 
7, 2010). 
 125. Id. 
 126. First Amended Complaint, FTC v. Watson, No. CV 09-598 MRP (PLAx) ¶ 35 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 12, 2009). 
 127. Id. ¶ 36. 
 128. Id. ¶ 32. 
 129. Id. ¶ 39. 
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ingredients.130 This patent expires in August 2020.131 
In May 2003, generic firms Watson and Paddock filed Paragraph-IV 
certifications challenging AndroGel.132 In August, Solvay sued each for 
infringement, which triggered automatic stays of FDA approval of the 
companies’ generic AndroGel versions until January 2006.133 
In its complaint, the FTC included several grounds on which Solvay 
might not be able to rely on its patent in preventing competition. First, the 
generic products contained ingredients not covered by the patent.134 
Second, the patent was invalid because of previous sales, because it was 
obvious, and because it did not provide an adequate written description.135 
Finally, the patent was unenforceable since, in its application, Solvay did 
not disclose a relevant agreement to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO).136 To keep its monopoly position, Solvay needed to prove 
infringement by the generics and had to defeat each of these infringement 
and unenforceability arguments. 
In any event, AndroGel had played a central role in Solvay’s portfolio. 
And the company projected that generic entry in mid-2006 would slash 
AndroGel sales by 90% within one year, cutting its profits by $125 million 
per year.137 
At the same time, generic firms were poised to enter the market. In 
January 2006, Watson received final FDA approval for its product.138 
Watson predicted an entry date of January 2007, and ordered commercial 
manufacturing equipment for intended use in late 2006.139 Paddock spent 
$750,000, approximately three-quarters of its annual equipment budget, on 
commercial manufacturing equipment.140 
Solvay settled with Watson and Paddock, as well as Paddock’s 
development partner Par. It agreed to pay Watson $19 million during the 
first year of the deal—eventually rising to $30 million annually—for co-
promoting AndroGel to doctors.141 And for six years, Solvay agreed to pay 
$10 million to Par for co-promotion and $2 million to Paddock for back-up 
manufacturing.142 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Id. ¶ 40. Solvay applied for the patent along with Belgian firm Besins Healthcare, S.A. In 
1999, Solvay filed a New Drug Application for AndroGel with the FDA, which approved it in 2000. 
Id. ¶ 34. 
 131. Id. ¶ 44. Solvay ultimately received an additional six months of “pediatric exclusivity” 
that runs through February 2021. Id
 132. Id. ¶ 45. 
 133. Id. ¶ 48. 
 134. Id. ¶ 87. 
 135. Id. ¶ 88. 
 136. Id. ¶ 89. 
 137. Id. ¶ 50.  
 138. Id. ¶ 53. 
 139. Id. ¶ 56. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. ¶ 66. 
 142. Id. ¶ 74. 
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B.  Adding the Product-Hopping Dimension 
Pursuant to the terms of the 2006 agreements, the generics agreed that 
they would not enter the market before 2015. Such entry would occur five 
years before patent expiration in 2020. 
Solvay, however, was not planning to encounter robust generic 
competition in 2015. Its strategy was to switch the market to a new version 
of testosterone gel. AndroGel contains 1% testosterone.143 The new 
product it was developing would contain 1.62% testosterone.144 
Between 2006 and 2015, Solvay was guaranteed that its formulation 
patent would not be challenged. With this luxury, it had sufficient time to 
develop and market the new testosterone gel. Such a change could benefit 
patients by allowing them to achieve results with less gel.145 
Even more obviously, the new formulation would be a windfall to 
Solvay. Such a switch would prevent automatic generic substitution. 
Patients, in other words, could not substitute generic versions of the new 
gel. There likely would be little demand for generic versions of AndroGel.  
This strategy was a central aspect of the agreements with generics. 
According to the FTC’s complaint, “Solvay told Watson of its plans for a 
line extension product.”146 Watson accepted delay in its entering the 
market until 2015 “even though a line extension product could have a 
severe negative impact on its potential sales of generic AndroGel by 
2015.”147 And Watson gained the right to co-promote not only AndroGel 
but also any line extension product.148 
In short, the generic entry date of 2015 might initially appear to be 
procompetitive by providing a guaranteed additional five years of 
competition. In the context of Solvay’s product-hopping strategy, however, 
it seems far less favorable. For after product hopping, there will be little 
demand for generic versions of AndroGel in 2015. By then, the market will 
be switched to the new testosterone gel product.149 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Id. ¶ 63. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. ¶ 66. 
 149. Another example is provided by Abbott’s TriCor, a cholesterol and triglycerides drug 
with more than $1 billion in annual U.S. sales. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Abbott, Teva Reach Deal that 
Delays Generic TriCor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527  
48703300504574568262242442986.html (last visited June 20, 2010). With Tricor’s patent expiring 
in 2011, Abbott pursued the product hopping/settlement combination to obtain every drop of profits 
it could. 
First, it developed the next-generation drug, TriLipix, for which it received FDA approval in 
December 2008 and which it began marketing in January 2009. David Phillips, Abbott Labs’ Deal 
with Teva Pharma Is ‘Phat News’ for Lipid-Lowering Franchise, BNET, Dec. 14, 2009, http://ind 
ustry.bnet.com/pharma/10005711/abbott-labs-deal-with-teva-pharmaceuticals-is-phat-news-for-
lipid-lowering-franchise/ (last visited June 20, 2010); Abbott Laboratories, Q1 2009 Earnings Call 
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V.  THE MISSING DIMENSION 
The exploration of the relationship between product hopping and 
settlement leads to insights not previously appreciated. In doing so, it 
recalls the parable of Flatland. 
A.  Flatland and Previous Analyses 
The story of Flatland centers on a two-dimensional world in which 
geometric shapes exist, unaware of other dimensions.150 Squares and lines 
in Flatland observe only the flat slices of three-dimensional objects that 
intersect with the plane. In the story, a square is able to leave Flatland and 
discover a third dimension, thereby exposing the limitations of the two-
dimensional world. 
These lessons are applicable to the intersection of product hopping and 
settlements. Until now, the competitive effects of pharmaceutical 
settlements have been analyzed on the plane of the single product that is 
the subject of settlement.151 One central line of inquiry on this plane has 
been the existence and analysis of reverse payments. 
For example, courts, government agencies, and commentators have 
examined the effects of settlement on generic firms’ entry for the particular 
product covered by settlement. They have especially focused on reverse 
payments that provide the brand firm with more protection than the patent 
provides. For example, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division has 
recently joined the FTC in advocating presumptive illegality for reverse 
payments: 
                                                                                                                     
Transcript, SEEKINGALPHA, Apr. 17, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/131529-abbott-labor 
atories-q1-2009-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1 (last visited June 20, 2010). In mid-2009, Abbott 
entered into a co-promotion agreement with AstraZeneca and “initiated a Trilipix branded consumer 
awareness campaign” that increased patient use “across all channels.” Ben Comer, Abbott, AZ 
Extend Co-promotion to Trilipix, MM&M, June 4, 2009, http://www.mmm-online.com/abbott-az-
extend-co-promotion-to-trilipix/article/138003/ (last visited June 20, 2010); Abbott Laboratories, 
Q3 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKINGALPHA, Oct. 14, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/ 
166543-abbott-laboratories-q3-2009-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1 (last visited June 20, 2010). 
Second, Abbott addressed the possibility of a generic version of TriCor by settling with Teva in 
December 2009, preventing the generic from reaching the market until (at the earliest) March 2011. 
Rockoff, supra. 
 150. EDWIN A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND 3–5 (Barnes & Noble Books 5th ed. 1884). 
 151. Before the 2003 Medicare amendments, settlements occurred on a patent-by-patent basis. 
The amendments shifted the focus to a product-by-product basis. See 149 CONG. REC. 31780, 31783 
(2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The Hatch-Waxman provisions in this bill also make the 
exclusivity available only with respect to the patent or patents challenged on the first day generic 
applicants challenge brand drug patents, which makes the exclusivity a product-by-product 
exclusivity rather than a patent-by-patent exclusivity.”). 
Even this axis is more complicated than initially appears because of the malleable nature of the 
expiration date of the last-expiring patent. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: 
Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 638 
(2009). 
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• As far back as 2002, the FTC argued that “paying a 
potential competitor to accept an entry date is a 
payment not to compete and presumptively 
anticompetitive.”152 
 
• In 2009, the Division aligned with the FTC in 
asserting that: “[T]he anticompetitive potential of 
reverse payments . . . in exchange for the alleged 
infringer’s agreement not to compete and to eschew 
any challenge to the patent is sufficiently clear that 
such agreements should be treated as presumptively 
unlawful.”153 
Many commentators have taken similar positions, again focusing on 
reverse payments: 
• Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark Lemley 
contend that reverse payments should be 
“presumptively unlawful” unless the payment “is no 
more than the expected value of litigation and 
collateral costs attending the lawsuit.”154 
 
• Tom Cotter advances “a rule of presumptive invalidity 
for all reverse-payment settlements.”155 
 
• Carl Shapiro and Mark Lemley view patents as 
“probabilistic property right[s,]”156 concluding that 
settlements “cannot lead to lower expected consumer 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Reply Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint at 25, In re Schering-Plough Corp., 
2003 WL 22989651, Part II.A (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003) (No. 9297), vacated by Schering-Plough Corp. 
v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/0 
21022rbocstc.pdf. Even before that, the FTC settled a reverse-payment case with Abbott 
Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals in 2000 that had delayed generic alternatives to the 
hypertension and prostate drug, Hytrin.  Agreement Containing Consent Order, In e Abbott Labs., 
No. 981-0395 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/abbottagreement.htm. 
 153. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 10, Ark. Carpenters 
Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2581-cv(L) (2d Cir. July 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f247700/247708.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Cipro Brief]. 
 154. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1759 (2003) (also requiring the patentee to show that “the ex ante 
likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant”). 
 155. Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse 
Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship, 
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1091 (2003). 
 156. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 (2003). 
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surplus than would arise from ongoing litigation”157 
and that reverse payments in excess of avoided 
litigation costs are “a clear signal that the settlement is 
likely to be anticompetitive.”158 
 
• Scott Hemphill suggests a “presumption of illegality” 
if the settlement “restricts the generic firm’s ability to 
market a competing drug” and also “includes 
compensation from the innovator to the generic 
firm.” 159 
 
• I have explained that “the appropriate default position 
for reverse-payment settlements should be 
presumptive illegality” and that a brand is likely to 
gain exclusivity beyond that provided by the patent 
“by supplementing the parties’ entry-date agreement 
with a payment to the generic.”160 
This focus on reverse payments makes sense in shining the spotlight on 
the most concerning settlements. Large reverse payments are most likely to 
raise red flags of potential patent invalidity, especially when generic firms 
receive more through settlement than they would have gained from 
entering the market. A focus on reverse payments is especially helpful 
given antitrust courts’ inability to directly determine issues such as patent 
validity and infringement.161 And the appropriate treatment of reverse 
payments has deserved significant attention given courts’ overly excessive 
deference to such settlements. 
But this spotlight on the evils of reverse payments may unwittingly 
absolve from condemnation agreements without reverse payments. 
Recently, firms have entered into nuanced agreements by which brand 
companies pay generic firms for IP licenses, the supply of raw materials or 
finished products, and assistance in product promotion. They agree not to 
launch authorized, brand-sponsored generics.162 And they promise, through 
                                                                                                                     
 157. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 94 (2005). 
 158. Shapiro, supra note 156, at 407. 
 159. Hemphill, supra note 49, at 1561. 
 160. Carrier, supra note 4, at 76. 
 161. Id. at 73 (“Determining patent validity and infringement would require significant 
analysis and testimony on complex issues such as patent claim interpretation and infringement 
analysis” that “could take weeks [and] cannot be inserted as mini-trials within antitrust cases.”). 
 162. FTC BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT 
OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2007 2 (2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/05/mmaact.pdf; FTC BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED 
WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss4/6
2010] THE MISSING DIMENSION OF PRODUCT HOPPING 1033 
 
settlement, that the generic firm can retain its 180 days of exclusivity.163 
Though courts do not always recognize it, all of these arrangements convey 
value to the generic firm. 
B.  Embracing the New Dimension 
As this Article shows, the focus on reverse payments also misses 
concerns associated with product hopping. In many cases, the relevant 
framework within which the brand firm maneuvers is not the single 
product that is the focus of settlement. Rather, it is the multiple products 
implicated in the firm’s lifecycle strategy. As a result, the realities of the 
pharmaceutical marketplace suggest an expansion of the relevant universe 
to include the reformulated product. 
Once the focus expands to consider the brand firm’s strategy, the 
framework shifts. Initially, when centered on the single product that is the 
subject of settlement, it resembles one in which 1) the brand firm maintains 
its monopoly, followed by 2) a period (before patent expiration) in which 
generic firms can enter the market, fostering competition. 
Consideration of the product-hopping dimension shifts the framework 
to one in which 1) the brand firm guarantees that its patent will not be 
challenged, followed by 2) a period (before patent expiration) in which any 
generic competition will mean little given the migration of patients to a 
new product not subject to state drug product selection laws. 
These two elements make up the core of the new dimension to the 
product hopping–settlement combination. 
1.  Guaranteed Immunity from Challenge 
The first prong emphasizes the period in which the generic firm agrees 
not to challenge the patent. For starters, the promise threatens the goals of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, which encouraged patent challenges, as opposed 
to agreements not to challenge patents. In particular, the exclusivity period 
is reserved for the first ANDA to challenge a patent and seek entrance 
before the end of the patent term. 
The promise also is concerning given that empirical studies have 
consistently shown that a significant percentage of granted patents are 
                                                                                                                     
AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2005 4–5 (2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf. 
 163. Hemphill, supra note 151, at 651–53. This “retained exclusivity” is quite valuable to the 
generic, which does not face the possibility of losing patent litigation and which gains much of its 
profits during the period in which it is the only generic on the market. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, GENERIC COMPETITION AND DRUG PRICES (2006), http://www.fda.gov/AboutF  
DA/CentersOffices/CDER/ucm129385.htm (last visited May 7, 2010) (noting that presence of one 
generic on market leads to 6% price reduction, entry of second generic lowers price to 
approximately half the brand price, and entry by six or more generic companies lowers the price to a 
quarter of the brand price). 
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invalid.164 As the Department of Justice explained in a recent brief: 
“Allowing the patent holder to claim antitrust immunity for its contracts as 
if they were litigated injunctions, while evading the risk of patent 
invalidation, deprives consumers of significant benefits from price 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.”165  
If the brand firm were not able to guarantee that its patent would be 
immune from challenge, any switch to the new product would face the 
hurdle of a patent challenge that could ultimately lead to invalidity. Such a 
finding would thwart the strategy. 
For in that case, the generic firm would be able to offer its version of 
the patented drug, entering the market before the brand firm has the chance 
to switch the market to its new product. And once the generic firm obtains 
a foothold in the market, the product-hopping strategy is far less likely to 
be successful.166 
One reason is that any attempt to prime the market for the product hop 
by increasing the price of the patented brand product would run headlong 
into the cheaper generic product, to which patients naturally would turn. A 
second reason is that any attempt by the brand firm to heavily market the 
new drug would suffer through competition against a less expensive 
generic version. 
That is why the combination is so powerful. For it allows the brand firm 
to methodically move to the new product at a time of its choosing. It need 
not fear the state DPS laws. It need not fear that generic firms would 
compete with its reformulated product. It need not fear that such 
competition would make the new product less attractive. 
As discussed above, product hopping is most successful when brand 
firms can prevent generic entry until after they can switch the market to the 
new product. During this period, brand firms trumpet the virtues of the new 
product, ignore the old product, and avoid generic competition. As 
Cephalon could confidently assure investors as a result of the strategy: 
“[T]here is nobody else in this space at this time.”167 
2.  Lack of Meaningful Competition After Generic Entry 
The second prong of the strategy is a lack of meaningful competition 
after generic entry. One factor on which courts and commentators have 
focused in analyzing settlements is the date of generic entry in relation to 
the time remaining in the patent term. Even a recently introduced Senate 
bill includes, in determining the validity of agreements, the factor of “the 
                                                                                                                     
 164. Carrier, supra note 4, at 64–65 (citing studies finding that courts invalidated at least 43% 
of patents and that an FTC study of Paragraph IV challenges in the 1990s showed that the generic 
prevailed in 73% of the cases). 
 165. U.S. Cipro Brief, supra note 153, at 16–17. 
 166. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 167. Cephalon Q1 2009 transcript, supra note 100. 
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length of time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent, 
compared with the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product.”168 
At the risk of oversimplifying, generic entry several years before the 
end of the patent term is generally viewed as procompetitive because it 
introduces generic competition in a setting in which the brand firm could 
have exercised monopoly power until the end of the patent term. 
Focusing on the product-hopping dimension, however, reveals that this 
period is entitled to less deference than might initially appear. For once the 
brand firm shifts the market to the reformulated product, often after raising 
the price of the old product and employing its heavy marketing artillery on 
behalf of the new product, generic competition will not play a meaningful 
role in the industry. 
One central reason is that generic firms cannot take advantage of state 
DPS laws. These laws allow—or even require—pharmacists to substitute 
generic versions of brand drugs. But switching the market to new products 
prevents generic firms from quickly demonstrating the equivalency 
necessary to take advantage of the laws. 
As discussed above, the concern when a brand reformulates its drug is 
that the generic version of the first product is not bioequivalent to the 
second product. And the generic firm typically will not be able to show 
bioequivalence for years, until it reformulates the product, receives FDA 
approval, and concludes patent litigation. 
As a result, the generic firm must play catch-up in developing versions 
of the reformulated product. Just one example was provided in the TriCor 
case, in which Abbott switched to new formulations on several occasions, 
buying time to avoid competition and “prevent[ing] pharmacies from 
filling TriCor prescriptions with a generic capsule formulation.”169 
The second reason that generic firms cannot offer meaningful 
competition is that the brand firm switches the market to the reformulated 
product before generic entry. Absent settlement, there is a chance that 
generic firms could successfully challenge the brand firm’s patent by 
showing that it is invalid or that its product does not infringe the patent. 
Either of these conclusions would allow immediate generic entry. As a 
result, pharmacists could offer, and patients purchase, generics at a time 
before the brand firm is able to switch the market to the reformulated 
product. In other words, the brand will have lost the critical advantage of 
timing. 
In that case, brand firms will not be able to offer the “uncontested 
message” of the new product’s superiority with detailers praising only the 
                                                                                                                     
 168. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 28(b)(1), (2009), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid= 
f:s369rs.txt.pdf. 
 169. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416 (D. Del. 2006). 
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new product.170 Nor could they avoid generic alternatives. Brand firms 
view a launch after generic entry as a “[t]otal [d]isaster.”171 Any 
reformulation would garner dramatically lower revenues and would suffer 
as products are “forever lost to the generics.”172 
For example, in the TriCor case, brand firm Abbott predicted that if it 
launched its reformulated version before generic entry, it would enjoy sales 
of 269 million Euros, far more than the 15 million Euros it would receive if 
the reformulation did not reach the market before the generic.173 
In short, even if settlement allows formal generic entry before the end 
of the patent term, the appropriate timeframe should be considered not just 
in the context of the patent at the heart of settlement but also in light of the 
brand firm’s product-hopping strategy. Through this lens, pre-expiration 
settlements appear far less favorable. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Two activities central to brand drug firm strategies in the early 21st 
century are settlements and product hopping. To date, courts and 
commentators have separately considered these activities. But an analysis 
of the combination of the two strategies uncovers anticompetitive concern 
that might otherwise evade scrutiny. 
In particular, settlements that allow generic entry before the end of the 
patent term are often trumpeted as offering procompetitive virtues in 
introducing competition before patent expiration. 
But a real-world analysis of product hopping shows that any such 
competition is often illusory. In many cases, by the time the generic enters 
the market, the brand will have switched the market to the new product. In 
fact, the timing of the reformulated product is a vital factor in determining 
the success of product hopping. Brand firms are far more likely to succeed 
if they can forestall generic entry until after they introduce the new 
product. Of course, by this time, generic versions of the older product do 
not offer effective competition. 
In short, courts determining the appropriate antitrust treatment of 
settlements should pay attention to the silent, but brutally effective, 
dimension of product hopping. 
                                                                                                                     
 170. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 50). 
 171. Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharms., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 172. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 1, ¶ 1028. 
 173. Shadowen et al., supra note 63. 
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